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CASE NOTE

COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITATIONS ON A
STATE'S REGULATION OF WASTE DISPOSAL

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE NEW JERSEY WASTE CONTROL
ACT-In holding that a state may not isolate itself from a national
problem by closing its landfills to waste from outside the state, the
Supreme Court may have been looking ahead to more serious conflicts over nuclear disposal. City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 98
S.Ct. 2531 (1978).
The New Jersey Waste Control Act' was designed to prohibit the
disposal in New Jersey landfills of waste originating outside that
state. After having been twice sustained by the New Jersey Supreme
Court against constitutional attacks, it was recently struck down by
the Supreme Court of the United States as an impermissible regulation of interstate commerce.
In the early 1970's the State of New Jersey found itself running
out of land to use for the disposal of waste. In 1973, the state
legislature found a threat to the quality of the environment and
declared "that the public, health, safety and welfare require that the
treatment and disposal within this State of all wastes generated outside of the State be prohibited." 2 The Waste Control Act was enacted to achieve that end.
Operators of private landfills in New Jersey, along with several
cities in other states that had agreements with the operators for
waste disposal suffered an immediate adverse effect. Two actions
were brought against New Jersey and its Department of Environmental Protection in state court.' The trial courts declared that the
law was unconstitutional because it discriminated against interstate
commerce. On appeal' the New Jersey Supreme Court consolidated
these cases and considered the constitutionality of the Waste Control
Act.
The New Jersey Court took pains to point out the dire nature of
1. N.J. Stat. Ann. § § 13:11-1 et seq. (Supp. 1978).
2. Id. §13:11-9.
3. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm. v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 127 N.J.
Super. 160, 316 A.2d 711 (ch. div. 1974); In the other case judgment was rendered on an
oral opinion. See Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm. v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill
Auth., 68 N.J. 451, 348 A.2d 506, 507 (1975).
4. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm. v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N.J.
451, 348 A.2d 506 (1975).
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the problem faced by the state. Several studies had been made and all
predicted that the state would run out of sites for landfill disposal
operations in the near future. In the court's opinion, the problem
had reached "crisis proportions."' Viewing the problem in this light,
the court proceeded to examine the constitutional issues raised by
the Waste Control Act and its accompanying regulations.
As a preliminary step the court addressed New Jersey's argument
that the Act presented no issues under the commerce clause of the
constitution. This argument was based on the theory that the waste
involved was valueless and therefore its movement was not commerce
within the meaning of the constitution. The United States Supreme
Court has long recognized the theory that interstate movement of
objects harmful to the general public falls outside of the scope of the
Commerce Clause. 6 But the New Jersey court found that theory, and
the state's argument slightly beside the point, because some of the
regulations designed to enforce the Waste Control Act were broad
enough to prohibit importation of waste that could have some economic value-for instance, recyclable waste. In any event, the court
assumed for purposes of its decision that the mere transportation and
disposal of valueless waste between states is interstate commerce for
constitutional purposes. 7
This brought the court to the issue of preemption-whether or not
the United States Congress had the exclusive right to legislate. Congress had taken action in the form of the Solid Waste Disposal Act of
1965,8 but the court found a clear intention not to pre-empt state
action. In fact, the court found that Congress had intended to encourage state action.
The next question was whether the Waste Control Act was a constitutionally impermissible regulation of interstate commerce. The
court expressed the opinion that there are two ways of defining
commerce for the purposes of applying the commerce clause.
Accordingly, when the clause is used to support some exertion of
federal control or regulation-an affirmative application-the clause
has been given a sweeping interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court.
On the other hand, when the clause is used to strike down or restrict
state legislation this is a negative application, and the reach of the
clause is much more confined. The current attempt, then, to use the
5. Id. 348 A.2d at 509.
6.
7.
8.
at 42

Id. 348 A.2d at 512.
Id. 348 A.2d at 514.
Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § § 3251 et seq. (1970) (current version
U.S.C.A. § §6901 et seq. (West 1977)).
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commerce clause to invalidate New Jersey's Waste Control Act would
be a negative application.
Relying on a 40 year-old Supreme Court opinion 9 and a more
recent treatise,' 0 the court arrived at criteria to use in testing a state
law under the "negative implications" of the commerce clause. The
court's test contained four questions. 1) Did the state legislature act
within its province? 2) Were the means of regulation reasonably
adapted to the end sought? 3) Does the legislation discriminate
against interstate commerce? 4) Is the burden on interstate commerce outweighed by the benefit to the state?' 1
The court found that the legislature had properly acted: there
being no federal pre-emption, the state was free to act. And the
legislation was a proper exercise of the state's police power because
the preservation of the environment and protection of ecological
values for the purpose of protecting the public health are primary
objectives of that power.' 2 Due to the serious nature of the problem, the court had no trouble finding that the means were reasonably
adapted to these objectives. In the court's words, "Less than total
exclusion of solid waste generated outside New Jersey would have
been to no avail." ' 3
The court was less than critical in its analysis of the discrimination
question. It concluded that because the legislature had had no intent
to impose economic barriers or create commercial restrictions, there
was in fact no economic discrimination against interstate commerce.
The court also observed that the ban on bringing garbage into the
state applied equally to refuse collectors both from New Jersey and
from out of state, and that out of state residents remained free to
collect and dump within the state. Therefore, concluded the court,
the Waste Control Act was not discriminatory.
Finally, the court found that the burden on interstate commerce
imposed by the Waste Control Act was "slight indeed" compared
with the benefit to the state of averting danger to the public health
and environment.'" Alternative methods and places of disposal were
found by the court to be available to neighboring states at little cost.
The court concluded that "where the effect upon trade and commerce is relatively slight, as is here the case, and where at the same
time the values sought to be protected by the state legislation are as
9. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
10. Engdahl, Constitutional Power: Federal and State § 11.03, at 272 (1974).
11. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm., 348 A.2d at 517.
12. Id. 348 A.2d at 516.
13. Id. 348 A.2dat 517.
14. Id. 348 A.2dat 518.
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crucial to the welfare of its citizens as is here true, we have no
hesitancy in sustaining the state action."I s
This decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Probable jurisdiction was noted April 5, 1976.1 6 Shortly before the
case was argued the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA) 1 7 was signed into law by President Ford. For this
reason, the judgment of the New Jersey court was vacated and the
case remanded. On remand the question for the N.J. court to decide
was "whether or to what extent the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 pre-empts the New Jersey [Waste Control

Act] "1 8

In June 1977, the N.J. Supreme Court announced its decision.' 9
It expressed the belief that the United States Supreme Court had
been "especially reluctant to find an intent to pre-empt where state
legislation has been enacted to serve local environmental interests." 2 0 And it found that although the RCRA called for waste
disposal guidelines to be established by the federal government, Congress intended to leave to each state the decision as to whether or not
to accept recommendations set forth in the guidelines.2" Thus the
previous decision of the N.J. court was affirmed, and the case was
appealed again to the United States Supreme Court.
On June 23, 1978 Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the
Court. The Court briefly agreed with the New Jersey court that the
Waste Control Act had not been pre-empted. It then turned to the
weightier constitutional question.
The Court criticized the N.J. court's belief that the definition of
commerce varies according to the purpose to which the Commerce
Clause is being put. The Supreme Court majority held that all objects
of interstate trade, including garbage, merit Commerce Clause protection, with none being excluded by definition. A state cannot escape
constitutional scrutiny when it bans out of state waste, merely by
labeling the waste "valueless.""22
The Court then summarized its past decisions defining permissible
and impermissible state regulation of interstate commerce. A virtually per se rule of invalidity has prevailed when the object of state
15. Id. 348 A.2d at 519.
16. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm., probable jurisdiction noted sub nom. City of
Philadelphia v. N.J., 425 U.S. 910 (1976).
17. Pub. L. No. 94580, 42 U.S.C.A. § §6901 et seq.
18. City of Philadelphia v. N.J., 430 U.S. 141, 142 (1977).
19. City of Philadelphia v. State, 73 N.J. 562, 376 A.2d 888 (1977).
20. Id. 376 A.2d at 891.
21. Id. 376 A.2d at 893.
22. City of Philadelphia v. N.J., 98 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (1978).
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regulation has been simple economic protectionism. 2 3 However,
"incidental burdens" on interstate commerce have been allowed
when they seemed to be an unavoidable result of state legislation
designed to protect the health and safety of people in the state.2 4
Legislation of this sort, which evenhandedly serves a legitimate local
purpose and only incidentally affects interstate commerce, will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. 2 1 The Court
found the crucial question to be whether the Waste Control Act was
simply a protectionist measure or a law directed to legitimate local
concerns with only incidental effect upon interstate commerce. 2 6
Contrary to the N.J. court, the Supreme Court found it not particularly helpful to make a determination of what it called the ultimate
legislative purpose of the Waste Control Act. The "evil of protectionism" can lurk in the means of legislation as well as in the ends.
Whether the legislature intended to reduce disposal costs to N.J.
residents or to protect the environment, the Court assumed the state
could have achieved either purpose by slowing the flow of all waste
into the remaining landfill sites, even though interstate commerce
would be incidentally affected. But discrimination against articles of
commerce coming from outside the state, without some reason apart
from the origin of the articles to treat them differently, is not a
permissible way to achieve the state purpose, regardless of the purpose. The Court held "Both on its face and in its plain effect, the
[Waste Control act] violates this principle of nondiscrimination.'7
In two cases decided early in this century, 2 8 the Supreme Court
held that a state may not accord its own citizens a preferred right of
access to natural resources within the state, to the disadvantage of
out of state consumers. These cases both involved state imposed
restrictions on transporting natural gas to other states. In the present
case the natural resource-landfill space-sought to be preserved for
the citizens of New Jersey at the expense of out of state citizens is
not an article of commerce, as had been the situation in the previous
natural resources cases. The Court found this difference inconsequential:
It does not matter that the State has shut the article of commerce
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

27. Id. at 2537.
28. Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
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inside the State in one case and outside the State in the other. What
is crucial is the attempt by one State to isolate itself from a problem
common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of
interstate trade. 2 9
Even if the law was found to be discriminatory, New Jersey asked
the Court to consider it to be a quarantine law. Such laws have been
repeatedly upheld even though they appeared to single out interstate
commerce for special treatment. 3 0 The Court has said that the states
"have power to ... prevent the introduction into the States of
articles of trade, which, on account of their existing condition,
would bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and death." 3 1 The
quarantine laws that have been upheld, however, did not discriminate
against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in
noxious articles, whatever their origin. 3 2
Accordingly, the Waste Control Act was found not to be a quarantine law. No claim has been made that waste from within New Jersey
was any less harmful to the life expectancy of landfill sites than
waste from outside the state. Because of this the Court found that
New Jersey's attempt to ban out of state waste while leaving landfill
sites open to in state waste was an obvious effort to saddle those
outside with the entire burden of making the remaining sites last
longer. The Court stated that "legislative effort is clearly impermissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution." A state may
not isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem shared by all. 3 3
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist focused attention on the asserted
health hazards presented by current state-of-the-art waste disposal.
He characterized the majority decision as offering New Jersey a Hobson's choice of either prohibiting all landfill operations in the state or
accepting waste from every portion of the United States. In his
words: "The physical fact of life that New Jersey must somehow
dispose of its own noxious items does not mean that it must serve as
a depository for those of every other State.. . New Jersey should be
free under our past precedents to prohibit the importation of solid
waste because of the health and safety problems that such waste
poses to its citizens."'3
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

City of Philadelphia v. N.J., 98 S.Ct. at 2538.
Id.
Bowman v. Chicago and N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888).
City of Philadelphia v. N.J., 98 S. Ct. at 2538.
Id. at 4805.
Id.
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CONCLUSION
It is probably significant that the court gave so little credence to
New Jersey's claims of the health hazards posed by the extra volume
of waste from out of the state. The court was much more impressed
with the fact that waste disposal is a problem shared by all of the
states, and it implicitly decided that all states must therefore share in
the solution. Also of note is the fact that the court's decision means
no state can prevent others from sharing its natural resource of waste
disposal sites, even though it is a resource which does not move in
interstate commerce.
Apparently, any state faced with a similar problem in the futurethe disposal of nuclear waste, for instance-will have to choose either
to ban all disposal or allow disposal of wastes from other states.
Although the Court implies that a claim that movement of a particular substance is hazardous might possibley lead to a different
result,3 this is little solace. That the Court would uphold a state's
outright ban against nuclear disposal is unlikely for two reasons.
First, if one state could impose such a ban, all could, and the problem would be aggravated rather than solved. Second, as technology
makes it increasingly safe to transport nuclear waste, the significant
problem remains the problem of permanent disposal. This is a
national problem, and, as the court says, "What is crucial is the
attempt by one State to isolate itself from a problem common to
many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate
3
trade.", 6
CHARLES L. McELWEE

35. Id. at 4804.
36. Id.

